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Abstract
Renement is usually employed to produce more concrete versions of a specication,
or to add new requirements to it. However, during specication revision one may
over-rene, thus incorporating unnecessary requirements. In this paper, we argue
that this process can be formalised by the notion of minimal renements, hence
avoiding over-renement, and prove that this denition is well-behaved theoretically
as well as computationally.
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1 Introduction
A common way to develop computer systems (whether hardware or software)
is by renement : one starts with an abstract specication, and renes it
gradually (e.g. [1]). The renements may be triggered by the need to satisfy
additional requirements. However, one would like to avoid rening the speci-
cation too much, in order to keep it exible and avoid building in unnecessary
assumptions. In this paper, we study minimal renements. We address the
question: given a specication and a requirement, what is the smallest rene-
ment of the specication which will make it satisfy the requirement?
Example 1.1 A university department has a policy which governs access to
student marks, including perhaps the requirements:

a student has read-access to all his marks;

a student does not have write-access to any of his marks;

a professor has read-access to all student marks, and write-access to the
marks of the modules she teaches.
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This system allows certain access operations and denies others. Because it is
under-specied it may also be non-deterministic about the outcome (whether
access allowed or not) of some operations. The policy may be encoded as a
non-deterministic transition system M . Any implementation which satises
the requirements, i.e. which renes M , is acceptable.
A further requirement is now imposed upon the department, perhaps by
new legislation, such as:

no student may have read-access to another student's marks.
To incorporate this, we seek a renement of M which satises the new re-
quirement. Naturally, we do not want to rene too much, unnecessarily loos-
ing exibility with respect of further requirements, so we attempt to rene
minimally, just enough to satisfy the new constraint.
We assume that specications and implementations of systems are repre-
sented as models (Kripke models or transition systems), and that requirements
are presented as logical formulas. We study the operator  which takes a model
M and a formula , and returns a set of modelsM  which is the set of least
renements of M which satisfy . We explore the following properties of this
operation:

When do minimal renements exist?

When are the properties of the minimal renements decidable?
These questions are studied in a variety of contexts, such as: nite models,
serial models, and m-saturated models.
We will use Kripke models to model systems. A well-understood notion
of renement in this context is simulation [12]. It has been studied exten-
sively as well as having served as the basis for a multitude of other more
ne-grained proposed notions for renement. The logic used in the following
is the polymodal logic K
n
(essentially Hennessy-Milner logic [8] extended with
propositional information) with an outlook on temporal logics. Using simula-
tion, we dene an ordering that depends on M , which captures renement of
M and that is related to the simulation preorder (see e.g. [3,7]). Then, M  
is dened as the set of the models of  that are minimal with respect to the
ordering.
Below we prove that for two important classes of Kripke models, the m-
saturated and the nite models, the operation is well-behaved. We characterise
the conditions that the specication and the property need to satisfy in order
for the operation to yield non-trivial results (i.e. not just all the models of ).
In the case of nite models, we prove that checking whether an implementation
is minimal is decidable and that for properties in a fragment of K
n
(and also
for a fragment of CTL

), checking whether such properties are true on the
results of the operation is decidable.
The denition of M  is reminiscent of, and indeed inspired from, theory
change and non-monotonic reasoning. In those elds one of the ways to dene
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a theory change operation is to dene an ordering on possible worlds that
captures a notion of closeness to the initial world, and then minimising with
respect to that ordering within a prescribed set of worlds. In this sense M 
is a non-monotonic operation since it may be the case that M   6j=  while
M j=  .
2 Denitions
Let A be a set of l atomic propositions. The modal language L of the logic
K
n
on A with k modalities is dened inductively

if p 2 A then p 2 L,

if ;  2 L then :;  ^  2 L,

if  2 L then 3
i
 2 L for all 1  i  k.
The usual propositional abbreviations apply as well as the modal 2
i
 :3
i
:.
The degree deg() of a formula  is dened as the maximum nesting depth of
modalities in .
A Kripke model M for L is a tuple hW
M
; r
M
; R
1
M
;    ; R
k
M
; v
M
i. W
M
is a
set of states or worlds. r
M
is a distinguished state inW
M
called the initial state
or the root. R
i
M
 W
M
W
M
are accessibility relations and v
M
: W
M
! 2
A
is
a valuation for the propositional letters. Satisfaction of formulas at a state s
is dened inductively by the usual propositional clauses along with the modal
one: M; s j= 3
i
 i there exists a state t 2 W
M
such that (s; t) 2 R
i
M
and
M; t j= . We will write s j=  when the model is obvious. By jM j we denote
the cardinality of W
M
. A model M is nite i jM j is nite.
A path is a nite sequence of states such that for any pair of states s
i
; s
i+1
in the sequence, there exists a j such that (s
i
; s
i+1
) 2 R
j
M
. The depth of a
state s is dened as the minimum length of a path from the root to s if such
a path exists, otherwise as !.
A model M for a logic with a single modality is called serial if the single
accessibility relation R
M
is serial, i.e. i for all states s 2 W
M
there exists a
state t 2 W
M
such that (s; t) 2 R
M
.
The set of sentences true at a state s is denoted by th(s). In the following
we will focus on validity of formulas on the root and not on the whole model as
is usual in modal logic. This approach is commonplace in the temporal logic
literature where models represent transition systems with a starting state.
Thus we dene the theory of a model to be the theory of its root, th(M) =
th(r
M
). Since the root is our `entry point' in a model, we will only consider
models whose states are all reachable from the root. Two models M;N are
logically equivalent i th(M) = th(N).
The logic usually studied in modal logic is the one enforced by global va-
lidity on frames. In other words,   j=  is taken to mean that for all frames F ,
if F j=  , then F j= . As noted above, we employ a local entailment relation
at the level of states of models, i.e. taking   j=  to mean that for all models
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M and all states s 2 W
M
, if M; s j=   then M; s j= . These two denitions
give rise to the same logic, a fact witnessed by the strong completeness of K
n
(see e.g. [2]). To simplify our exposition, we will use an axiomatisation that
is equivalent to the usual for K
n
but validates the deduction theorem at the
cost of losing the necessitation rule. This axiomatisation has modus ponens
as its sole rule of inference and as axioms it has all propositional tautologies,
possibly prexed by an arbitrary sequence of box modalities and any formula
of the form 2
i
1
: : :2
i
n
(2
j
()  )) (2
j
) 2
j
 )).
Let M;N be models and B  W
M
W
N
a relation. B is a bisimulation if

It relates the initial states, (r
M
; r
N
) 2 B,

It respects the valuations, (s; t) 2 B implies v
M
(s) = v
N
(t),

If (s; t) 2 B and s
0
is an R
j
M
-successor of s then there exists t
0
, an R
j
N
-
successor of t, such that (s
0
; t
0
) 2 B, for all j (the forth condition),

If (s; t) 2 B and t
0
is an R
j
N
-successor of t then there exists s
0
, an R
j
M
-
successor of s, such that (s
0
; t
0
) 2 B, for all j (the back condition).
If there exists a bisimulation between M;N then M and N are bisimilar,
written M  N and it follows that th(M) = th(N).
An approximation of bisimulation is n-bisimulation. Two models M;N
are n-bisimilar, written M 
n
N i there exists a sequence of relations 
n

   
0
 W
M
W
N
such that

r
M

n
r
N
,

For all 1  i  k and all m < n, if s 
m+1
t and s
0
is an R
i
M
-successor of s
then there is an R
i
N
-successor t
0
of t such that s
0

m
t
0
,

For all 1  i  k and all m < n, if s 
m+1
t and t
0
is an R
i
N
-successor of t
then there is an R
i
M
-successor s
0
of s such that s
0

m
t
0
,

For all m  n, if s 
m
t then v
M
(s) = v
N
(t).
Bisimilarity implies n-bisimilarity for all n, but the converse is not true in
general. Another standard result about n-bisimulations is that M 
n
N i
for all formulas  with deg()  n, M j=  i N j= . Also, a result which
we will make use of below is that for all n there is an eective procedure for
computing a nite set of nite models T
n
such that (a) every model in T
n
is a
tree of depth at most n and (b) for any model M there is a tree T 2 T
n
such
that M 
n
T . These results can be found in [13].
A formula is called positive universal i it is made up only from p;:p;^;_
and 2
i
for all 1  i  k. L
PU
is the subset of L that consists of positive
universal formulas. If s is a state then PU(s) = L
PU
\ th(s). If M is a model,
then PU(M) = PU(r
M
). Dually, a positive existential formula is made up
from p;:p;^;_ and 3
i
. L
PE
and PE are dened similarly and are duals of
L
PU
and PU respectively. Note that the negation of a PU formula is a PE one
and vice versa. If P is a set of PU sentences then P
c
is the complement of P
with respect to L
PU
. P contains the negation of every formula in P .
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Intuitively, positive universal formulas describe restrictions on what states
are accessible. In the context of transition systems, PU formulas prescribe
what conditions a sequence of actions must satisfy if it is to be allowed. Dually,
a PE formula asserts the possibility of the execution of a sequence of actions.
Let M be a model and s 2 W
M
a state. A set of sentences T will be
called satisable on the successors of s i for each relation R
i
M
there exists
a state t 2 W
M
such that (s; t) 2 R
i
M
and T  th(t). Similarly, T will be
called nitely-satisable on the successors of s i for each relation R
i
M
and
for any nite set of sentences F  T there exists an R
i
M
-successor t of s such
that F  th(t). A state s is called m-saturated i for any set of sentences
T , if T is nitely-satisable on the successors of s, then it is satisable on
the successors of s. A model is m-saturated if all its states are m-saturated.
mod
m
() is the class of m-saturated models M of . We write MSAT for the
class of m-saturated models. Notice that MSAT is bisimulation-closed.
In the following we will use the ultralter extension of a model. We will
not make reference to the internals of the construction, just to two of its
properties: the ultralter extension of a model M is another model ue(M)
that is logically equivalent to M and also, ue(M) is m-saturated. Accounts of
the construction appear in many places, e.g. [2].
A class of models has the Hennessy-Milner property whenever for every
pair of its models, they are bisimilar i they are logically equivalent. In other
words, models in a Hennessy-Milner class are completely characterised by the
logic, i.e. if two such models are not bisimilar then there is a witnessing formula
that distinguishes them.
MSAT has the following important properties [9]

It subsumes the class of image-nite models (and hence the nite ones).

It has the Hennessy-Milner property.

It is maximal in the sense that no proper superclass of MSAT has the
Hennessy-Milner property.

It has also been used to provide semantics for process algebras.
Let M;N be models and S  W
M
W
N
a relation on their states. S will
be called a simulation i it satises the rst three clauses in the denition
of bisimulation, i.e. it must link the initial states, preserve valuations and
respect the accessibility relations but in one-way only (the forth condition). If
there exists a simulation from M to N we write M ! N or N  M and say
that N simulates M or that M is simulated by N . Whenever M  N and
M ! N we will say that M and N are similar or simulation equivalent and
write M  N . It is easy to check that simulations are transitive.
Let M be a class of models. An ordering  over M is stoppered for
a formula  i for any model M 2 mod
M
() there is another model N 2
mod
M
() such that N  M and that N is -minimal in mod
M
(). The
denition is extended for sets of sentences in the obvious way.
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3 Results
Let M;N
1
; N
2
be models. We dene an ordering 
M
such that N
1

M
N
2
i
(i) M  N
1
 N
2
or
(ii) M  N
1
but M 8 N
2
or
(iii) N
1
 N
2
.
It is not hard to prove that this ordering is transitive and reexive. By taking
similarity as the main equivalence notion between models, antisymmetry is
obtained, i.e. if A 
M
B and B 
M
A then A B. In other words, 
M
is a
partial order.
Let M be a class of models, M a model inM and T a set of sentences.
We dene an operation 
M
:M 2
L
! 2
M
M 
M
T = min

M
(mod
M
(T ))
This denition reminds one of a type of theory change which is known as
update [11]. It is a point-wise denition, i.e. the ordering depends on a model
rather than an arbitrary theory as is usual in the case of revisions, the other
well-known type of theory change (see, e.g. [6,10]). In addition, the ordering
is partial, a condition which automatically validates the update axioms via
the representation theorem mentioned in [11].
Given such an operation, several questions arise. Firstly, it is not obvious
that it is well-dened, i.e. whether the existence of minimal models is guaran-
teed so that M 
M
T 6= ;. We address this question in propositions 3.6 and
3.11, for the class of m-saturated models and arbitrary sets of sentences and
for the class of nite models and arbitrary sentences, respectively.
Moreover, it is of interest to know the conditions that guarantee non-
triviality of the results of the operation, or in other words, when it is the
case that M 
M
T  mod
M
(T ). The necessary and suÆcient conditions for
non-triviality are presented in lemmas 3.4 and 3.7 for m-saturated and nite
models, respectively. In addition, the decidability of determining non-triviality
for a nite model M and a formula  is proved in lemma 3.8.
Finally, in the case of nite models, we prove that two interesting problems
are decidable: rstly, that checking minimality of a nite modelN with respect
to a nite modelM and a formula  is decidable (lemma 3.12). Secondly, that
reasoning within a fragment of the language about the results of the operation
is decidable, i.e. answering queries of the form M   j=  (proposition 3.14).
The rst three lemmas characterise simulation in syntactic terms, and
establish an exact match in the m-saturated case.
Lemma 3.1 (Folklore) IfM;N are models such that M  N , then PU(M) 
PU(N).
Lemma 3.2 (Folklore) Let M;N be models. If PU(M)  PU(N) and M is
m-saturated, then there exists a simulation from N to M , M  N .
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Proof. For convenience we will work with PE formulas, the dual of PU ones.
Note that PU(s)  PU(t) i PE(s)  PE(t). Dene a relation S such that
(s; t) 2 S i s 2 W
N
, t 2 W
M
and PE(s)  PE(t). We prove that S
is a simulation. Obviously it respects the valuations, i.e. if (s; t) 2 S then
v
N
(s) = v
M
(t). Assume that s has a successor s
0
with respect to a relation
R
i
N
. Let P be the set of PE sentences of s
0
. For any nite subset F  P ,
s
0
j=
V
F and thus s j= 3
i
V
F . 3
i
V
F is a PE formula, so by denition
it is satised at t. Thus there is an R
i
M
-successor of t that satises
V
F . In
other words, P is nitely-satisable on the successors of t. M however is m-
saturated, thus there is an R
i
M
-successor t
0
of t that satises P and as such
PE(s
0
)  PE(t
0
).
So, S is a simulation whenever it is non-empty and it relates the initial
states. Those conditions are satised by the assumption PU(M)  PU(N) or
equivalently PE(N)  PE(M). 2
Let T be a set of sentences. T is closed under taking disjuncts i whenever
 _  2 T then  2 T or  2 T . T is closed under L
PU
-consequence i
whenever T `  and  2 L
PU
then  2 T .
Lemma 3.3 Let P  L
PU
. There exists a model M such that P = PU(M)
i P is consistent, closed under L
PU
-consequence and taking disjuncts.
Proof. The left-to-right direction is trivial. Right-to-left: for a model M to
have exactly P as its set of PU formulas, it must satisfy P and falsify its
complement with respect to L
PU
. In other words, there exists such a model
i P; P
c
6` ?. Assume the latter is not the case. Then there exist formulas
;  
1
; : : : ;  
m
such that  2 P (note that P is closed under conjunction),
: 
i
2 P
c
and ;: 
1
; : : : ;: 
m
` ?. But then,  `  
1
_ : : : _  
m
and since P
is closed under L
PU
-consequence,  
1
_ : : : _  
m
2 P . P is also closed under
taking disjuncts so there exists 1  j  m such that  
j
2 P which is a
contradiction because  
j
2 P
c
. 2
If no model of a set of sentences T is simulated by a model M , then as
noted in the beginning of this section, all models of T will be incomparable
with respect to the ordering 
M
, and thus, M 
m
T = mod
m
(T ). If there is
at least one such model in mod
m
(T ), then 
m
will return a strict subset of
mod
m
(T ), in view of the second clause of the denition of the ordering. The
conditions under which this happens are characterised in the next lemma.
Lemma 3.4 Let M be an m-saturated model and T a set of sentences. Then,
there exists an m-saturated model N of T such thatM  N i PU(M); T 6` ?.
Proof. Left-to-right: SinceM  N it follows from lemma 3.1 that PU(M) 
PU(N). Thus N is a model of both T and PU(M).
Right-to-left: Let N be a model of PU(M) [ T . Then, PU(M)  PU(N).
Since N may not be m-saturated, we take the ultralter-extension of N , ue(N)
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which is logically equivalent to N and as such a model of PU(M) [ T , and
m-saturated. It follows that T  th(ue(N)) and that PU(M)  PU(ue(N)).
As M is m-saturated it follows from lemma 3.2 that M  ue(N). 2
The following lemma and proposition concern stopperedness of the order-
ing for m-saturated models. Lemma 3.5 enables us to apply Zorn's lemma
by proving that for any suitable chain (i.e. a totally ordered set of models), a
suitable lower bound can be found, and indeed, the inmum.
Lemma 3.5 Let M be an m-saturated model and T a consistent set of sen-
tences of which M is not a model. Let C  mod
m
(T ) be a nonempty chain
with respect to 
M
where all of its members are simulated by M . Then there
exists an m-saturated model of T which is the inmum of C (modulo simula-
tion equivalence).
Proof. Dene P =
T
N2C
PU(N). Since any model N in the chain is simu-
lated by M , PU(M)  PU(N) and therefore PU(M)  P . Also, for any two
models A;B 2 C it will be the case that PU(A)  PU(B) or PU(B)  PU(A).
We will prove that there exists a model I with PU(I) = P which satises T .
P is obviously consistent as a subset of consistent sets. Also, it is easy to
check that P is closed under L
PU
-consequence.
We now prove that P is closed under taking disjuncts. Assume _ 2 P .
Then, for all L 2 C, L j=  _  . If all the models in C satisfy  we are
done, so assume that there exists a pair of models N;N
0
2 C such that
N j= ^: and N
0
j= :^ . But this contradicts the fact mentioned above,
that PU(N)  PU(N
0
) or PU(N
0
)  PU(N). Hence P is closed under taking
disjuncts.
From lemma 3.3 it follows that P[P
c
is consistent. Assume that P; P
c
; T `
?. Then there exist :
1
; : : : ;:
n
2 P
c
such that P; T;:
1
; : : : ;:
n
` ? or
equivalently P; T ` 
1
_ : : : _ 
n
. Thus, for all N 2 C, N j= 
1
_ : : : _ 
n
,
hence 
1
_ : : : _ 
n
2 PU(N) and therefore 
1
_ : : : _ 
n
2 P . As P is closed
under taking disjuncts there is one disjunct 
j
such that 
j
2 P , which is a
contradiction. So there is a model I of P [P
c
[T . I need not be m-saturated,
but its ultralter extension ue(I) is, and as it is logically equivalent to I it
will satisfy P [ P
c
[ T too.
By the denition of P we have that for all N 2 C, PU(ue(I))  PU(N).
Thus, by lemma 3.2 we get that ue(I)  N . Also, PU(M)  PU(ue(I))
which implies that M  ue(I). So, ue(I) is a lower bound of C with respect
to 
M
. In addition, for any other lower bound L of C, it follows that PU(L) 
T
N2C
PU(N) and thus that ue(I) is the inmum of C (modulo similarity).2
In propositions 3.6 and 3.11 we prove stopperedness for m-saturated and
nite models, respectively. The application of Zorn's lemma is usually a crucial
part of such proofs. The commonly cited version of Zorn's lemma, however,
is not enough to yield stopperedness when its premises are satised. We use
an easily derivable, but stronger version: if X is a partially-ordered set and
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any well-ordered subset of X has a lower bound in X, then for any element
of s 2 X, there exists a minimal element s
0
2 X that is comparable to s,
i.e. s
0
 s.
Proposition 3.6 Let M be an m-saturated model. The ordering 
M
over the
class of m-saturated models is stoppered for any consistent set of sentences T .
Proof. If T  th(M) then, of course, M is a minimum with respect to

M
in mod
m
(T ), as well as any other m-saturated model N of T such that
M  N . It follows that for any m-saturated model L of T there is an m-
saturated model of T , i.e. M , which is minimal and M 
M
N . In the case
where M =2 mod
m
(T ), it may or may not be the case that PU(M) [ T is
consistent. If not, then by applying lemma 3.4 it follows that there are no
models in mod
m
(T ) that are simulated by M . Hence, only the third clause of
the denition of 
M
can ever apply, rendering all (equivalence classes under
simulation of) models in mod
m
(T ) incomparable. In this case, for any model
N 2 mod
m
(T ) there is a model N
0
(namely N itself) such that N
0

M
N ,
where N
0
is minimal.
Thus, we assume that PU(M) [ T is consistent. Because of the second
clause of the denition of the ordering, it is easy to see that in this case the
set of minimal elements will be a subset of mod
m
(PU(M) [ T ). Therefore we
restrict our attention to the models in mod
m
(PU(M)[ T ) which, by virtue of
lemma 3.4, are all simulated by M . Then, for a chain in mod
m
(PU(M) [ T ),
lemma 3.5 applies. Since it asserts something about any chain, i.e. any totally-
ordered set of models, it specialises directly to well-ordered chains of models.
Therefore, by Zorn's lemma, for any model N 2 mod
m
(T ) there exists another
model N
0
2 mod
m
(T ) such that N
0
is minimal and N
0

M
N . 2
This concludes our set of results for m-saturated models. For nite models,
we start again from characterising the conditions under which the operation is
non-trivial, and also prove the decidability of determining non-triviality. We
will use mod
f
() to denote the class of nite models that satisfy .
Lemma 3.7 Let M be a nite model and  a formula. Then, PU(M);  6` ?
i there exists a nite tree L of depth at most deg() such that L j=  and
M  L.
Proof. The right-to-left direction is trivial. So, we assume the former and
apply lemma 3.4 to obtain a (possibly innite) model K such that K j= 
and M  K. We construct a nite model L of  such that K  L. For
a xed n there is a (computable) nite collection of trees T
n
of depth up to
n such that for any model A there is a tree T 2 T
n
such that A 
n
T . Let
n = deg(). Let L be the tree in T
n
such that L 
n
K. Obviously L j= . The
n-bisimulation between K and L is also a (backwards) simulation between K
and L, i.e. K  L. Because of transitivity of simulations, M  L. 2
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Lemma 3.8 Let M be a nite model and  a formula. The decision problem
of whether there exists a nite model L of  such that M  L is decidable.
Proof. From lemma 3.7 it follows that if there is such a model there is also
a nite one. Indeed one with depth at most n = deg(). We produce T
n
.
For each model T in T
n
we check whether T j=  and whether M  T (both
problems are decidable because M and T are nite). 2
Let L be a model, and s 2 W
L
one of its states. s is said to have in-
degree one whenever it has a unique ancestor with respect to the union of
all accessibility relations in L. L will be called smooth i every state in W
L
apart from the root has in-degree one and nite depth, or in other words, L
is a countable tree. For every model L there is a smooth one L
s
such that
L  L
s
. The proof of this result as well as of a general version of the following
lemma can be found in [5]. This lemma will allow us to concentrate on simple
simulations, i.e. functional ones, in what follows.
Lemma 3.9 Let K andM be models such that K is smooth, M is m-saturated
and M  K. Then there exists a functional simulation from K to M .
Proof. We dene a function S : W
K
! W
M
and prove by induction that for
any t 2 W
K
, PE(t)  PE(S(t)). We set S(r
K
) = r
M
. Since M  K it follows
from lemma 3.1 that PU(M)  PU(K) and thus PU(S(r
K
))  PU(r
K
), or
PE(r
K
)  PE(S(r
K
)).
Assume that S has been dened for all states in K of depth up to n 1 and
let t 2 W
K
be a state of depth n. Since K is smooth, t has a uniquely dened
ancestor t
0
with respect to some relation R
i
K
. By the inductive hypothesis,
PE(t
0
)  PE(S(t
0
)). So, for any nite set of PE sentences F  PE(t), it follows
that t
0
j= 3
i
V
F , hence S(t
0
) j= 3
i
V
F , and as such, there exists a u 2 W
M
such that u j=
V
F and (S(t
0
); u) 2 R
i
M
. In other words, PE(t) is nitely
satisable on the R
i
M
-successors of S(t
0
) which through the m-saturation of
M gives us that PE(t) is satisable at a R
i
M
-successor u
0
. We set S(t) = u
0
and this completes the proof. 2
In the following lemma we construct a model, the set of states of which is
dened by the disjoint union of a collection of (sets of states of) models. To
that end we use the following notational device: ifW = fA;B; : : :g is a family
of models then an element of the disjoint union of the sets of states of models
in W is written as hZ; si where Z is a model in W and s is a state in Z,
i.e. s 2 W
Z
. Lemma 3.10 is the basis for most of the results concerning nite
models; it asserts that when M  K for some nite model M and a possibly
innite model K, with K j= , then there is a nite model of a bounded size
that satises  and stands in-between M and K.
Lemma 3.10 Let M be a nite model and  a sentence. Assume that there
exists a (possibly innite) model K of  such that M  K. Then there exists
a nite model L of  such that M  L  K. In addition, the size of L is
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bounded by a computable function f dependent on M and .
Proof. Let U be the smooth counterpart of K. Since U  K and M  K it
follows that M  U . Moreover, since M is nite it is also m-saturated thus
lemma 3.9 applies, giving us a functional simulation S between U and M .
Let n = deg(). Let A be the submodel of U , having the same root
and such that no state has depth more that n   1. Formally W
A
= f s 2
W
U
j depth(s)  n  1 g, r
A
= r
U
, R
i
A
= R
i
U
\W
A
W
A
for all 1  i  k and
v
A
is the restriction of v
U
on W
A
.
If t 2 W
U
then U
t
is the generated submodel of U with t as its root.
Similarly, by M
s
we denote the generated submodel ofM with s as its root. It
is easy to see that since S is functional, the image of U
t
under S is a submodel
of M
S(t)
.
Dene a model N in the following way:
(i) W
N
is the disjoint union of W
A
, and of W
M
S(t)
for all t 2 W
U
with
depth(t) = n. In symbols, if t 2 W
A
then hA; ti 2 W
N
and if t
0
2 W
M
S(t)
for some t 2 W
U
with depth(t) = n then hM
S(t)
; t
0
i 2 W
N
. The latter is
well-dened because for any state t
0
in W
U
with depth n or more, from
the smoothness of U it follows that there is a unique ancestor of depth n
of t
0
.
(ii) r
N
= hA; r
A
i.
(iii) R
i
N
is the disjoint union of R
i
A
and R
i
M
S(t)
for all t of depth n, along with
another component: for all states s 2 W
U
with depth n   1 (and hence
in W
A
), if for some i, (s; t) 2 R
i
U
then (hA; si; hM
S(t)
; ti) 2 R
i
N
.
(iv) v
N
is dened in the natural way, i.e. if hA; ti 2 W
N
then v
N
(hA; ti) =
v
A
(t). If hM
S(t)
; t
0
i 2 W
N
for some suitable t
0
and t, then v
N
(hM
S(t)
; t
0
i) =
v
M
S(t)
(t
0
).
From the denition of N it follows that N 
n
K and thus, N j= .
Dene a relation S
UN
as the smallest one with the following properties

For all t 2 W
U
with depth(t) < n (thus in W
A
too), (t; hA; ti) 2 S
UN
.

If (s; s
0
) 2 S such that there is a state t 2 W
U
with depth n such that
s 2 W
U
t
, then (s; hM
S(t)
; s
0
i) 2 S
UN
.
Similarly, dene S
NM

If (s; t) 2 S where depth(s) < n then (hA; si; t) 2 S
NM
.

For all hM
S(t)
; t
0
i 2 W
N
, (hM
S(t)
; t
0
i; t
0
) 2 S
NM
.
It is easy but tedious to verify that S
UN
and S
NM
are simulations. Thus,
M  N  K.
We now prove that N has a nite bisimilar counterpart L. Since the states
at depth n are all initial states of generated submodels of M , there can be at
most jM j non-bisimilar ones. The nodes at depth n  1 can have 2
l
dierent
propositional valuations where l is the number of atomic propositions. Also, a
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node at depth n  1 can have 2
jM j
possible dierent combinations of children
from depth n, so the maximum number of non-bisimilar states at depth n  1
is 2
l
2
jM jk
, where k is the number of accessibility relations. In general, if there
are g(i+1) non-bisimilar states at depth i+1, there are g(i) = 2
l+g(i+1)k
many
non-bisimilar states at depth i. Thus, the total number of states will consist
of (a) the initial state, (b) the sum of the number of states at each layer, with
depth ranging from 1 to n   1, and (c) the number of non-bisimilar states
in all the possible generated submodels of M , i.e. jM j
2
. So, there is a nite
model L with at most f(M;) = 1 +
P
deg() 1
i=1
g(i) + jM j
2
states, which is
bisimilar to N .
Since L  N and M  N  K it is easy to see that M  L  K and
that L j= . 2
Proposition 3.11 Let M be a nite model. The ordering 
M
over the class
of nite models is stoppered for any consistent sentence .
Proof. As in the proof of proposition 3.6, it is easy to check that whenM j= 
or PU(M);  ` ? then for any model N 2 mod
f
() there exists a model
N
0
2 mod
f
() such that N
0

M
N and N
0
is minimal. So we assume that
M 6j= , that PU(M);  6` ? and restrict our attention to the models in
mod
f
(PU(M) [ fg).
Let C  mod
f
(PU(M) [ fg) be a chain with respect to 
M
. Since nite
models are m-saturated, from proposition 3.5 we obtain that there is an m-
saturated I which is a model of PU(M) [ fg and a lower bound of C with
respect to 
M
. But then, by lemma 3.10, there is a nite model F of  such
thatM  F  I. Therefore, F is a lower bound of C and by applying Zorn's
lemma we obtain stopperedness for the class of nite models. 2
We continue with a set of decidability results concerning the nite case.
Firstly we prove that checking whether a specic model N is minimal with
respect to a model M and , i.e. whether N 2 M 
f
, is decidable. We will
say that M 
f
 is non-trivial whenever M 6j=  and PU(M);  6` ?.
Lemma 3.12 Let M;N be nite models and  a sentence, such that M 
f

is non-trivial. The decision problem of whether N 2M 
f
 is decidable.
Proof. Since M 
f
 is non-trivial then if M 8 N then surely N is not
minimal. So, we assume that M  N . Now, N is minimal i there is no
other model N
0
2 mod
f
() such that N
0
<
M
N . Assume N is not minimal.
Then there exists N
0
2 mod
f
() such that M  N
0
 N but N
0
9 N .
By applying lemma 3.10 to the pair of models M;N
0
it follows that there
exists a model N
00
2 mod
f
() such that M  N
00
 N
0
and thus, N
00
9 N .
Therefore, N is not minimal i there exists a model N
00
of  which is strictly
smaller than N with respect to 
M
and it has at most f(M;) states.
Consequently, given N;M and , we can enumerate all the models of 
that have at most f(M;) states, of which there is a nite number. For each
model L we check the simulations M  L, L  N , L 9 N . If we nd a
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model that satises all those conditions, then N is not minimal. If we do not
nd one, then by using the result in the previous paragraph, N is minimal.2
The next proposition characterises the structure of M 
f
 with respect to
the ordering. It asserts that each equivalence class of models in M 
f
 with
respect to 
M
, contains a representative model of a bounded size.
Proposition 3.13 Let M be a nite model and  a formula such that M 
f

is non-trivial. Then, there is a computable nite set of nite models 
M;

M 
f
 such that for any model N 2M 
f
 there is a model N
0
2 
M;
such
that N  N
0
and jN
0
j  f(M;).
Proof. Let N 2M 
f
. The application of lemma 3.10 gives us a model N
0
of  such that M  N
0
 N and jN j  f(M;). But since N is minimal,
it follows that N  N
0
. Thus 
M;
can be computed by enumerating the
nite models of  that have at most f(M;) states and checking them for
minimality via lemma 3.12. 2
A corollary of the above is that given the premises of proposition 3.13,
the number of equivalence classes of nite models that constitute M 
f
 is
nite. We next examine the decidability of reasoning about the results of the
operation.
Proposition 3.14 Assume that M 
f
 is non-trivial. Let  be a formula in
L
PU
[ L
PE
. Then, the decision problem M 
f
 j=  is decidable.
Proof. M 
f
 can be seen as the union of a (nite) set of equivalence classes
of nite models under simulation. Let E  M 
f
 be such an equivalence
class. For any two models N
1
; N
2
2 E it holds that PU(N
1
) = PU(N
2
) and
equivalently PE(N
1
) = PE(N
2
). In other words, the problem of checking
whether all models in M 
f
 satisfy  , where  2 L
PU
[ L
PE
, reduces to
checking whether for each equivalence class E in M 
f
, there is a model
N 2 E such that N j=  . But 
M;
contains at least one model from each
such equivalence class, so the problem is further reduced to whether 
M;
j=  
or not. Since 
M;
is nite and computable, the problem is decidable. 2
Lastly, we mention some results that extend the ones in this section to serial
models and the corresponding fragment to the PU formulas in the temporal
logic CTL

[4], known as 8CTL

[7] and its dual 9CTL

. Due to lack of space
we omit the proofs that are in any case trivial extensions of the above. Note
that in the following, the formula-argument of the operation  remains a K
n
formula.

If M;N are serial models, then M  N implies 8CTL

(M)  8CTL

(N).

If M;N are serial m-saturated models then 8CTL

(M)  8CTL

(N) im-
plies M  N .

Lemma 3.5 extends to serial models too (the idea being that lemma 3.5 can
be used as is but with T extended to T [, where  = f 2
n
3> j n  0 g).
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It follows that proposition 3.6 extends to serial m-saturated models.

Lemma 3.10 extends to serial models. The crucial point is that generated
submodels of a serial model are serial as well. This implies that proposition
3.11 extends to serial nite models.

Similarly, lemma 3.12 and proposition 3.13 extend to the case of serial nite
models, by adding (decidable) checks for seriality in the models involved in
the proofs.

Proposition 3.14 can be extended to the following: Assume the conditions
of proposition 3.13. Let  be a formula in 8CTL

[ 9CTL

. Then, the
decision problem M 
fs
 j=  is decidable.
4 Conclusions and Further Work
Our results are positive and intuitive, showing that

The renement ordering 
M
with respect to a model M is stoppered, and
therefore has minimals, in the class of m-saturated models, for any set of
sentences; and in the class of nite models, for any formula.

The properties of minimal renements over nite models are decidable.
A limitation of our framework is the expressiveness of the underlying logic
K
n
. Properties that involve e.g. transitivity, quantication over sets of states
or computational paths in the model, cannot be expressed in K
n
. To address
this, we intend to extend our results to more expressive languages, and already
have a preliminary set of results concerning K
n
but with global validity in
mind. Furthermore we intend to investigate the complexity of the algorithms
we have presented.
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